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SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
James A. Gardner 
University at Buffalo School of Law 
State University of New York 
jgard@buffalo.edu 
The United States has an extremely robust network of subnational constitutions.  It is one 
of the few federations in the world, along with perhaps Canada and Switzerland, in which 
subnational entities are understood to be fully competent polities with virtually complete 
constituent powers of self-organization and self-authorization.  The authority to adopt a 
subnational constitution is consequently understood to be an incident of subnational sovereignty, 
a concept in turn derived from a conception of the basic federal order itself as highly 
decentralized. 
Within this order, subnational powers of self-governance are understood to be plenary 
except as limited either permanently by the federal constitution, or temporarily by the exercise of 
national power that supersedes state law under the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.  Thus, 
the dominant constitutional issue within the U.S. federal system has never concerned the scope of 
power or authorization of the states, but rather the scope and authorization of the national 
government, and its consequent authority to occupy policy domains and to enact laws that 
constrain the authority of states to pursue their own preferred forms and paths of self-governance. 
On that issue, there is a longstanding, bitter dispute, going all the way back to the founding, of 
 
1 Context: Nature of the Federation 
such profundity that, even today, to make any assertion about the nature of the U.S. federation is 
necessarily to enter into a deeply political – and even partisan – debate. 
Foreign observers routinely characterize the United States as a classic example of a 
coming-together federation.1  Its constituent units were independent before the nation was 
founded, and each unit governed itself fully under its own constitution.  Indeed, the period 
between the outbreak of the American Revolution, in 1776, and ratification of the U.S. 
Constitution in 1789, is perhaps the most exuberantly fertile period of constitution-writing and 
constitutional experimentation in the global history of constitutional governance.  During that 
thirteen-year period, the newly independent American states experimented with widely different 
structures of self-governance, writing and adopting 16 different constitutions.2 
Within U.S. legal and political discourse, however, the nature of the founding was 
ambiguous from the start.  On one hand, the American colonies were founded at different times, 
for different purposes, in different circumstances. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
Pennsylvania, for example, were founded by members of dissenting religious sects (Puritans, 
Separatists, and Quakers, respectively) primarily to secure religious liberty, whereas Virginia and 
Georgia were founded mainly for purposes of commercial exploitation.  These kinds of 
1 Thomas O. Hueglin and Alan Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2015), 100; Francesco Palermo and Karl Kössler, Comparative Federalism: 
Constitutional Arrangements and Case Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017), 42-43. 
2 G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 
61; James A. Gardner, ‘Autonomy and Isomorphism: The Unfulfilled Promise of Structural Autonomy in American 




differences were reflected in the colonies’ initial governing instruments, royal charters granted by 
the British Crown.  Moreover, the colonies over time developed different economic regimes, 
with the New England colonies eventually achieving dominance in maritime trade and 
manufacturing and the southern colonies heavily reliant on cash crops such as tobacco and 
cotton. Economic organization interacted with demographic patterns, with the north more urban, 
industrial, egalitarian, and wealthier, and the south more rural, agrarian, and poorer, with greater 
inequality. 
On the other hand, with the significant exception of an enslaved African population in the 
south – which, of course, was unable to express itself politically – the populations of the colonies 
were neither ethnically nor linguistically diverse, the great majority being of British descent.  All 
thirteen colonies had a common colonial master throughout their existence, and all thus received 
the same legal, social, and linguistic inheritances.  The Revolution itself (1776-1783) was 
conducted collaboratively and simultaneously, with no colony attempting to remain allied with 
the mother country.  Moreover, unlike the French Revolution, the American Revolution was not 
conducted with the objective of rejecting and sweeping away the values or institutions of the 
colonial master, but rather, as the revolutionaries often maintained, for the purpose of vindicating 
rights they believed that all colonists held as Englishmen3. The colonies governed themselves 
collectively before they achieved independence, first through the pre-revolutionary Continental 
Congress, and after 1781 under the Articles of Confederation, a confederal constitution that 
endured until ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1789. 
3 E.g., Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press, 1967), 283-284. 
3 
Thus, the founding period provides some evidence to support three different conceptions 
of the United States federation. One is that it was formed through voluntary agreement by 
thirteen distinct political societies. A second is that the founding states were throughout their 
history fundamentally a single populace that had been governed for administrative reasons in a 
decentralized fashion, and which acquired self-sovereignty collectively following independence. 
A third view is that the original relationship of the thirteen colonies is irrelevant because it was 
completely superseded by the adoption of the United States Constitution.  This view, which 
draws heavily on the contractarian premises of the brand of constitutionalism to which the 
American founders adhered, conceives the adoption of a constitution as a kind of singularity – a 
socio-political Big Bang in which a new society both forms itself and establishes for its own 
governance an entirely new and complete constitutional order – a novus ordo seclorum, a new 
order for the ages.4  Formation of such a new order, on this account, not only replaces but 
destroys all traces of the previous one.5 
None of this would be a matter of great importance but for the original curse of the 
nation’s founding – slavery – which made the nature of the federation politically salient from the 
start. Southerners, perpetually fearful that disapproving northerners would use control of the 
national government to undermine slavery, almost immediately began to develop an account of 
the U.S. federation according to which the states possessed the plenary sovereignty of 
independent nations, the United States possessed only so much authority as the states chose to 
4 This phrase has since 1782 appeared on the reverse of the Great Seal of the United States.  Journal 
of the Continental Congress, 22:339 (June 20, 1782).  See also Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The 
Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985). 
5 Jacob T. Levy, ‘Not So Novus an Ordo: Constitutions without Social Contracts’, (2008) 37 
Political Theory 191, 195. 
4 






delegate (which, on this account, was minimal), and the constitutional mechanism of federalism 
existed to protect the states against the slightest national intervention in their internal 
organization and policy choices.6 
By the 1850s, during the run-up to the U.S. Civil War (1860-1865), southern intellectuals 
had developed a thicker account of the founding that supplemented this legal account with an 
ethnographic one.  According to this account, southerners and northerners were descended from 
distinct British sub-populations that had taken different sides in the English Civil War, and were 
thus ethnically and ideologically distinct, and lived within societies characterized by 
fundamentally distinct and deeply incompatible cultures.7  The better view, however, is that this 
account was little more than political propaganda intended to strengthen the south’s case for 
secession.8 
In the north, public opinion was divided.  Some accepted the southern account of the 
nature of American federalism, but others, motivated by anti-slavery sentiment, began to develop 
a competing account of the union in which the nation was conceived as a single, unified polity; 
its interests were superior to the necessarily parochial interests of any state; national power was 
6 John C. Calhoun, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States, in John 
C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government and Selections from the Discourse (New York: Bobbs-Merrill 1953). 
7 William R. Taylor, Cavalier and Yankee: The Old South and American National Character (New 
York: George Braziller, 1961), 15; Emory M. Thomas, The Confederate Nation, 1861-1865 (New York: Harper & 
Row 1979), 9; David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861 (New York: Harper & Row 1976).  
8  John Hope Franklin, ‘”As For Our History . . . .”’, in Charles Grier Sellers (ed.), The Southerner 
as American (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1960); Drew Gilpin Faust, The Creation of 
Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1988); James A. Gardner, ‘Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of State 






consequently great; and the national government had significant authority to take steps to 
eradicate the evil of slavery.9 
These disputes were of course settled militarily and constitutionally by the Civil War.  In 
1869 the U.S. Supreme Court issued its famous declaration that the U.S. Constitution had created 
“an indestructible union of indestructible states,”10 a statement fully consistent with the novus 
ordum seclorum account of the founding.  Even so, disagreement about the nature of the 
federation remained unsettled socially and politically.  Following its defeat, the South grudgingly 
retired its formal, de jure system of slavery, but replaced it with an almost equally brutal, 
informal regime of “Jim Crow” racial segregation and white political domination of the 
population of former slaves and their descendants.11  At the same time, southern propaganda 
about southern distinctiveness and the highly decentralized nature of the federation actually grew 
more intense,12 and for a full century following the end of the Civil War the southern states 
maintained successfully, both in Congress and in the courts, that federalism insulated them from 
national power to impair the illiberal Jim Crow regime.13 
9 Paul C. Nagel, One Nation Indivisible: The Union in American Thought, 1776-1861 (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press 1964). 
10 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869). 
11  C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955). 
12 Gardner (1998), supra n. 8, at 1232-33. 
13 Edward L. Gibson, Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ch. 3; Robert Mickey, Paths Out of Dixie: The Democratization of 




To this day, an essentially multinational account of U.S. federalism, influenced by this 
long record of southern propaganda, can still be found, not only in the academic literature,14 but 
even occasionally in decisions of state courts, an issue that is treated below in Section 6.  The 
long and continuing history of this dispute, however, means that to enter into this debate is 
necessarily to take a position in contemporary U.S. politics.  To claim that the United States is a 
coming-together federation formed by previously distinct sovereigns that retained their original 
sovereignty is, to some extent, to ally oneself with southern secessionism and Jim Crow 
segregationism;15 while to maintain that the United States is a single, unified polity that has 
merely decentralized itself for purposes of self-governance and the protection of liberty,16 is 
inevitably to take the side of unionism, antislavery, and the twentieth-century civil rights 
movement. 
The dispute even has a contemporary partisan valence, with Republicans since the 
Reagan era generally preferring an account in which the federal government is weak, and 
Democrats preferring accounts that support strong central power.  Interestingly, however, there is 
considerable evidence that ideological and partisan preferences regarding federalism and the 
nature of the union are, and to a great extent have always been, parasitic on current substantive 
14  E.g., Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of Sections in American History (New York: 
Henry Holt and Co., 1932); David Hackett Fischer, Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989); Daniel J. Elazar, ‘The Principles and Traditions Underlying State Constitutions’, 
(1982) 12 Publius 11; Ernest A. Young,’The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness, and Political 
Culture in the American Federal System’, (2015) Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2015-11. 
For a critique, see James A. Gardner, Interpreting State Constitutions: A Jurisprudence of Function in a Federal 
System (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), ch. 2. 
15 William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (New York: Little, Brown, 1964), 
153-155. 
16 James A. Madison, ‘The Federalist, Nos. 46-51', in Clinton Rossiter (ed.), The Federalist Papers 







policy preferences.17  That is, habitual supporters of robust U.S. decentralization and a weak 
central government are generally willing to tolerate and even to prefer a strong union and strong 
central government when their party controls the central government, and vice versa. 
None of this, however, diminishes the basic agreement in the United States that the states 
possess a great degree of power; that American states are fully competent polities for purposes of 
subnational self-government; and that state self-governance through subnational constitutions is 
normal and desirable. The dominant debate within American federalism – and consequently 
within American subnational constitutionalism – has, to the contrary, concerned the scope of 
national power, with the nature of the federation vigorously contested because of the difference it 
makes in the degree to which the federal constitution, or laws enacted by the national 
government, are capable of constraining the otherwise plenary scope of subnational authority.  
2.1 Symmetry of subnational autonomy 
Among U.S. subnational entities, all fifty U.S. states enjoy perfect symmetry in their 
powers and autonomy.  Of course, there is significant asymmetry among the states in their 
resources and endowments – California, for example, has nearly seventy times the population of 
Wyoming, and its economic output is nearly ninety times that of Vermont.  These informal 
asymmetries influence the functional power and importance of the states in many institutional 
settings, including the U.S. House of Representatives, where state polities are represented in 




proportion to their populations. In the Senate, however, where each state has equal 
representation (Art. I, § 3), resource and population asymmetries have no significant impact. 
Although all states enjoy symmetrical formal status and power, other subnational entities 
in the United States do not. The District of Columbia, the capital city, is unrepresented in 
Congress, though its residents may vote for president and vice-president.18  The U.S. also 
maintains several “territories” or “possessions” that it acquired during periods of colonial 
expansion, which enjoy far less autonomy than the states.  These include Puerto Rico, the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.  These territories are not represented in Congress, 
and their populations are ineligible to vote for any federal office.  The status and autonomy of 
these jurisdictions raise complex issues that are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
2.2 Scope of state autonomy 
As indicated above, the scope of state autonomy in the United States is presumed to be 
plenary except as limited by the U.S. Constitution.  These limitations are, on their face, minimal. 
The residual clause of the U.S. Constitution provides: “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”19  By operation of this provision, as well as by inference from the 
structure of the U.S. Constitution,20 the states are presumed to possess all powers of which they 
are not by the Constitution affirmatively dispossessed.  Article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution 
18 U.S. Const., amend. XXIII (1961). 
19 U.S. Const., amend. X (1791). 




provides a short list of powers that the states are specifically denied.  These include the powers to 
make treaties, coin money, enact ex post facto laws, grant titles of nobility, or, without 
congressional consent, levy import or export taxes, or maintain a peacetime army or navy.  A 
potentially more significant express limit on state power is the Guarantee Clause, which requires 
states to maintain a “republican” form of government (Art. IV, § 4), meaning a representative 
democracy.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held this provision to be judicially 
unenforceable, meaning its enforcement is left to Congress, which has thus far never invoked it 
to intervene in state political affairs.21 
Over time, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized other, more significant 
limitations on subnational power that it has found to be implicit in the federal constitutional 
scheme. The most significant is a doctrine of implied limitation on the scope of state economic 
regulation known as the “dormant Commerce Clause.”  Under this doctrine, states are forbidden 
to regulate their own economies in ways that (1) “discriminate” against commerce originating in 
or flowing to other states, i.e., amount to economic protectionism; or (2) impose an excessive 
“burden” on interstate commerce.22  This doctrine is designed to preserve and encourage the 
growth of a national economic market.23  Another implicit limitation on state power is a 
21 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).  The inactivity of the U.S. Congress under this clause thus 
contrasts greatly with that of the Argentine central government, which has invoked a nearly identical clause on 
roughly 170 occasions to intervene in provincial affairs. Mario D. Serrafero, ‘La intervencion federal en Argentina: 
Experienciay jurisprudencia’, (n.d.) http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs/Misc/Arg8_Serrafero%20paper%20Esp.pdf. 
22 South Carolina state Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Philadelphia v. 
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 




prohibition on adopting and conducting foreign policy.24  Of course, as is true in most federal 
states, U.S. subnational units do conduct an informal kind of foreign policy when, for example, 
they promote their commercial products to overseas markets, but no U.S. state follows anything 
like the European regional practice of, say, maintaining a permanent consulate in Brussels to 
influence supranational policy.25 
Another kind of limitation on the scope of state autonomy, also common in federal states, 
is the requirement that subnational power be deployed consistently with human rights guaranteed 
at the national level. This means that all state laws and actions, including provisions of state 
constitutions, must comport with provisions of the U.S. Bill of Rights, including the freedoms of 
speech, press, and religion, and a host of provisions regulating criminal procedure.  States must 
also comply with federal requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws, and may 
not deny the franchise on grounds of race, gender, or failure to pay taxes, nor may they deny the 
vote to anyone over eighteen years of age.26 
In practical terms, however, the most significant limitations on state power are not 
standing constitutional limits on the scope of state autonomy, but contingent limitations imposed 
by the enactment of national laws and policies.  The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
provides: “The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
24 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 
363 (2000). 
25 Stephen Weatherill, ‘The Challenge of the Regional Dimension in the European Union,’ in 
Stephen Weatherill and Ulf Bernitz (eds.), The Role of Regions and Sub-National Actors in Europe (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2005), 14-15. 





thereof; and all Treaties made . . . under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land.”27  The U.S. Supreme Court has given this provision a rather broad 
interpretation so that state law is “preempted,” or invalidated, not only when it directly conflicts 
with federal law, but also when it impedes or frustrates the achievement of federal objectives, or 
when the federal regulatory scheme is so “pervasive” as to “fully occupy” a regulatory domain, 
thereby leaving no room at all for state regulation, even when the state law in question might be 
consistent with the federal scheme.28 
The significance of the Supremacy Clause for state autonomy lies in the enormous growth 
of the national regulatory state since the 1930s.  Nearly all the most extensive U.S. programs of 
social welfare, environmental protection, consumer protection, transportation policy, labor 
relations, and old age and pension policy have been enacted at the national level, greatly 
narrowing the ability of states to regulate in domains of significant economic and social interest 
that would otherwise be available to them. Moreover, the federal government has often deployed 
its power to spend money in a way that imposes practical limitations on state autonomy by 
conditioning the receipt of federal funds on compliance with federal programmatic and 
regulatory requirements.29  Thus, the main battle lines between national and subnational power in 
the United States are typically defined by state efforts to preserve their autonomy by attempting 
27 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
28 Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992). 
29 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); National Federation of Independent Business v. 




to confine the reach of national legislation, or by negotiating state opt-out provisions, efforts that 
have generally achieved only occasional success.30 
2.3 Procedures 
2.3.1 Federal oversight 
The U.S. Constitution makes no mention at all of subnational constitutions; the power of 
states to adopt such constitutions was not only well-established by 1789, but was viewed as 
inherent in the sovereignty possessed by the original states.  As a result, the procedures for 
adoption and amendment of state constitutions are regulated entirely by the states themselves in 
their own constitutions. The U.S. Constitution does not authorize the federal government to 
exercise supervisory authority over the procedures of adoption or content of state constitutions, 
other than the requirement of the Supremacy Clause that provisions of state constitutions 
conform to the requirements of federal law. 
The only exception to this principle is that Congress has construed its own power to 
admit new states to the union (Art. IV, § 3) to authorize it to require submission for its approval 
of a proposed constitution as a condition for the admission of any new state.  All except the 
original thirteen states were admitted to the union subject to this condition, though Congress 
rarely exercised its authority to reject a proposed state constitution.  A rare and notable example 
of the use of this federal authority occurred in 1911, when the Arizona Territory sought 
admission to the union. It submitted a proposed constitution that included a provision allowing 
for “recall” – removal from office by popular vote – of elected state judges.  Congress by law 






approved admission of Arizona on these terms, but President Taft vetoed the law on the ground 
that popular removal of judges was inimical to the rule of law.  Arizona then resubmitted its 
constitution without the controversial provision, Congress again approved, and the President 
signed the bill, admitting Arizona as the 48th state.31 
Almost immediately thereafter, however, Arizona amended its state constitution by 
adding back in precisely the judicial recall provision to which President Taft had objected.  The 
United States had no further recourse, however, as the U.S. Constitution does not authorize the 
federal government to exert any control over the content of the constitutions of states once they 
have been admitted to the union.32  The relevance of even this limited form of federal oversight is 
today probably nil: the last two states to be admitted to the union, Alaska and Hawaii, were 
admitted in 1959, and there are no serious candidates for future statehood, although statehood has 
sometimes been mentioned as an option for the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. 
2.3.2 Procedural variations 
All states distinguish between adoption and amendment of state constitutions.  New 
constitutions typically must be adopted by convention – that is, by exercise of the people’s 
constituent power through the election of representatives to a constitutional convention 
specifically authorized to draft and to submit for popular approval a new constitution.  At one 
31 John D. Leshy, ‘The Making of the Arizona Constitution’, (1988) 20 Arizona State Law Journal 1, 
101-106. 






time, such conventions were relatively common.33  Of the 233 constitutional conventions held by 
American states, 143 were held during the nineteenth century – about one every eight months. 
Constitutional conventions often led to the discarding and replacement of existing constitutions, 
in some states with some frequency; Louisiana, for example, has had eleven different 
constitutions since it was admitted to the union, Georgia nine, South Carolina seven, and 
Virginia, Alabama, and Florida six each.34  The present constitutions of fourteen states contain 
provisions requiring at regular intervals that a referendum question be put to the people asking 
whether a constitutional convention should be convened.35  However, no state has held a full-
scale convention since 1986,36 meaning that amendment has become the preferred, and 
essentially the exclusive, procedure for making formal changes to state constitutions. 
Procedures for amending state constitutions differ somewhat from state to state. 
Delaware is unique in permitting amendment of the state constitution by two-thirds vote of the 
state legislature without any requirement of popular ratification.37  All other states utilize one or 
both of two procedures. The first is legislative enactment of a proposed amendment which is 
then submitted to the voters for approval. Legislative approval requirements range from a simple 
majority of both houses (10 states), to a two-thirds majority of both houses (16 states).  Fifteen 
33 John J. Dinan, The American State Constitutional Tradition (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2006), 8-9. 
34 Gardner (2005), supra n. 14, at 27. 
35 Dinan (2006), supra note 33, at 11. 
36 John Dinan, State Constitutional Politics: Governing by Amendment in the American States 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2018), 30-31. 






states additionally require legislative approval in two consecutive legislative sessions before 
referral to the voters.38 
The second procedure for constitutional amendment is direct popular proposal and 
approval of an amendment by initiative, a procedure available in 18 states, mainly in the west. 
Initiative amendment typically requires the collection of signatures, in some cases from 
registered voters and in others from citizens, on a petition demanding a vote on the proposed 
amendment. Signature thresholds vary between three and fifteen percent of the number of votes 
cast in the most recent election for statewide or national offices. Often a proposed initiative 
amendment receives scrutiny from the state’s legal authorities to ensure its legality and 
compliance with procedural requirements before placement on the ballot. Most initiative states 
require approval only of a simple majority of voters; a few require a supermajority.39 
The availability of initiative amendment has been construed in several states to raise a 
constitutional boundary problem – namely, the difference between “amendment” and “revision” 
of a subnational constitution. According to this doctrine, proposals to significantly revise state 
constitutions must be generated either by the legislature or a constitutional convention; initiative 
amendments, in contrast, are confined to smaller-scale changes.40  Policing of this boundary has 
required state courts to identify a small number of constitutional principles so fundamental to the 
basic structure of the document that changing them significantly would amount to more than a 
mere “amendment,” and thus must be effectuated by convention or legislative referral – that is, 
38 Dinan (2018), supra note 36, at 14. 
39 Ibid., 16-19. 




3 Position of State Constitutions within the States 
following a process considerably more deliberative than the initiative process is presumed to be. 
For example, the California Supreme Court has ruled that significant restrictions on the power of 
the judiciary to enforce individual rights cannot be imposed by initiative amendment.41  The 
Florida Supreme Court has similarly ruled that a change in the organization of the state 
legislature from bicameral to unicameral would constitute a revision that can be effectuated only 
following referral by the legislature or a convention.42 
Another frequently self-imposed procedural limitation on initiative amendments is the 
“single subject rule,” which requires initiative measures to confine themselves to one subject 
matter at a time.43  Many state constitutions impose a similar restriction on ordinary legislation.44 
In both cases, the restriction appears rooted in an idealized conception of the legislative process 
that disapproves of logrolling and vote-trading as undesirable deviations from ideal lawmaking 
behavior, which requires individual consideration of every proposal on its merits. 
The position of subnational constitutions within the state legal systems is equivalent to 
the role of national constitutions within national legal systems.  First, they are entrenched, in the 
sense that they cannot be altered or repealed through ordinary legislative processes.  Second, they 
provide the fundamental law of the subnational units that adopt them: all ordinary state 
41 Ibid. 
42 Adams v. Gunter, 238 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1970). 
43 Robert F. Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 405-408. 






legislation and state governmental actions must comport with the state constitution.  Moreover, 
U.S. subnational constitutions are both unified and comprehensive – everything that is of 
“constitutional” rank within the state legal system is to be found within the four corners of the 
state constitution and its amendments; the U.S. legal system does not at any level recognize the 
existence of “constitutional laws” of the type found in Austria or Italy, for example.45 
As described below in Part 4, the main functions of American state constitutions are to 
organize subnational power and to entrench certain policy commitments.  However, state 
constitutions also may be, and from time to time are, used as vehicles for the expression of 
subnational resistance to national power and policies.46  For example, California added the so-
called Victims’ Bill of Rights to its constitution in 1982.  This provision eliminated from the 
California Constitution the so-called “exclusionary rule,” which excludes from consideration by 
courts in criminal cases evidence of guilt that was acquired by the police in contravention of 
constitutional limits on government authority to search for and to seize inculpatory evidence.  In 
so doing, the people of California expressed strong disapproval of the scope of the federal 
exclusionary rule, which at the time had been given a broad construction by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, causing the prevention or invalidation of many convictions in which evidence of the 
defendant’s guilt was clear, but had been acquired by unconstitutional means.47  In many 
45 It is sometimes said that some U.S. laws have over time become so crucial to the legal order that 
they may properly considered to be “entrenched” or of quasi-constitutional status.  William N. Eskridge, Jr., and 
John Ferejohn, ‘Super Statutes’, (2001) 50 Duke Law Journal 1215.  If this is true, however, then it is true only as a 
matter of convention rather than formally, and such conventions would not be amenable to judicial recognition or 
enforcement. 
46 James A. Gardner, ‘State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a 
Functional Theory of State Constitutions,’ (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal 1003. 





instances, discussed further in Part 6, state supreme courts have construed state constitutions to 
provide more robust protection for human rights than the U.S. Constitution, and have often done 
so in ways that express criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court’s construction of the federal 
document. 
More commonly however, however, U.S. state constitutions tend to lack symbolic value 
to the state populace, and even to lack political salience within their states. In fact, state 
constitutions tend to be poorly known or understood by state polities.48  In contrast, Americans 
tend to know much more about the U.S. Constitution, and are much more likely to orient 
themselves toward national constitutional principles than toward state ones.49 
One of the consequences of the low political salience of state constitutions is that state 
constitutional politics sometimes degenerate into a contest among obscure special interests for 
entrenchment of narrow policy preferences through constitutionalization.  For example, 
California voters have regularly been confronted with initiative amendments proposing measures 
regulating insurance, some backed by the industry for its benefit and others backed by private 
groups for the benefit of consumers.  
In general, American political parties do not, even at the state level, adopt commitments 
to the reform of state constitutions. To the extent parties concern themselves with constitutional 
reform, they tend to focus on the federal constitution.  There are no regional political parties in 
the United States that mobilize around ethnic, religious, or linguistic distinctions with 
48 Tarr, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
49 David N. Schleicher, ‘Federalism and State Democracy’, (2017) 95 Texas Law Review 763; James 
A. Gardner, ‘The Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, Political Parties, and the National Colonization of State 





4 Content of U.S. Subnational Constitutions 
implications for the content of subnational constitutions. Thus, in the United States, there are no 
parties equivalent to, say, Scottish or Catalan nationalist parties that advocate either secession or 
amendment of national or subnational constitutions in ways that would change the role of the 
subnational unit within the national polity.  
On the other hand, in states that permit constitutional amendment by initiative, the major 
political parties sometimes exploit the initiative process for the purely tactical reason of 
mobilizing turnout in elections for low-salience government offices.  For example, the 
Republican Party has sometimes attempted to mobilize its base to turn out and vote for 
uninspiring candidates by deliberately maneuvering onto the same ballot provocative initiative 
amendments proposing severe restrictions on abortion or taxation, or expanding gun or property 
rights, issues that reliably motivate the party’s base to turn out to vote.50 
4.1 Identity 
The practice of using subnational constitutions as vehicles for the assertion of a 
distinctive subnational identity is essentially nonexistent in the United States.  Although virtually 
all U.S. state constitutions begin with a preamble declaring them to have been made by “the 
people” of the state, such references are understood in context to refer merely to the state 
population as a civic subcommunity of the nation rather than as a socially or culturally distinctive 
group with an enhanced or historically grounded claim to self-determination.  Moreover, states 
Stephen P. Nicholson, Voting the Agenda: Candidates, Elections, and Ballot Propositions 







have no authority to define or condition subnational citizenship: the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution provides: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are 
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.”  Under this provision, any 
person with U.S. citizenship automatically becomes a citizen of any state in which he or she 
chooses to settle, and state citizenship changes with every subsequent interstate change of 
residence. 
Furthermore, state constitutions almost never include any description of the state polity in 
ethnic, religious, or linguistic terms.  The one exception is provisions in some states declaring 
English to be the official language of the state.51  Such provisions generally express a fear that 
some kind of implicit state ethnic or linguistic identity is endangered by settlement within the 
state of native Spanish speakers. Official language provisions generally have only symbolic 
value, and when they do go further and attempt to direct official behavior, they risk invalidation 
under federal constitutional principles of freedom of speech and equal protection.52 
The rarity with which U.S. subnational constitutions make claims about subnational 
identity has several causes.  First, identity in the U.S. has been understood historically more in 
civic than ethnic terms; to be an American has generally meant to subscribe to a certain set of 
liberal principles and ideals rather than to belong to any particular ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
group.53  Second, subnational identities in the United States are in fact not distinctive.54 
51 E.g., Alabama Constitution amend. 509; Arizona Constitution, art. 28 § 1-6; Colorado Constitution 
art. I, § 30a; Florida Constitution art. II, § 9. 
52 Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998). 
53 Gardner (1998), supra note 8, at 1285-86. 
54 Ibid., passim. 
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Although the U.S. population is extremely diverse racially, ethnically, religiously, and 
linguistically, that diversity does not align with state boundaries.  Indeed, the boundaries of U.S. 
states have been aptly described as “highly arbitrary and . . . represent nothing but cartographers' 
and Congressmen's convenience.”55  Third, as discussed above, state constitutions – perhaps for 
the reasons just described – have low political salience and so are unlikely to recommend 
themselves to state polities as vehicles for the expression of a distinctive identity, even if such 
identities existed. 
4.2 Organization of powers 
U.S. states have virtually plenary powers of self-organization, subject only to the minimal 
federal constitutional restrictions that the form of government be “republican” and not 
monarchical or aristocratic.56  Within this framework, every state constitution divides the state 
government into three branches, legislative, executive, and judicial.  Forty-nine of the fifty states 
have additionally chosen to follow the federal model of a bicameral legislature (Nebraska, with a 
unicameral legislature, is the one exception).  However, in many states the legislature is 
conceived as essentially a part-time and largely amateur assembly that draws citizens to the 
capital temporarily for business and then returns them as quickly as possible to their customary 
place in civil society.  This is accomplished by constitutional provisions that limit the frequency 
and duration of legislative sessions, impose short terms of office (typically no more than two 
55 Russell Kirk, ‘The Prospects for Territorial Democracy in America’, in Robert A. Goldwin (ed.), A 
Nation of States: Essays on the American Federal System (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), 42. 






years), and establish restrictive limits on the number of terms a legislator can serve (often no 
more than four or six years).  For example, the Montana Constitution provides: “The legislature 
shall meet each odd-numbered year in regular session of not more than 90 legislative days.”57 
The intention of these provisions is benign and democratic: they seek to align the interests 
of legislators and citizens by ensuring that legislators are drawn from the general citizenry rather 
than a distinct political class, and that they remain in close touch with their constituents. 
However, the actual effect of these provisions appears to be to reduce the power of the 
legislature, thereby transferring power to the governor and the executive branch bureaucracy, 
which are permanent, full-time, professional, and well-funded.58 
On the executive side, all states have adopted a presidential rather than parliamentary 
structure of governance, with an independently elected governor serving as chief executive of the 
state. However, unlike the U.S. Constitution, which creates a unitary executive branch under the 
direction of a single chief executive, most state constitutions provide for independent popular 
election not only of the governor, but also of lower executive branch officials such as the state's 
attorney general or chief financial officer, and many provide for popular election to numerous 
other cabinet-level executive offices. In North Carolina and North Dakota, for example, ten 
executive branch officials are separately elected, including the Commissioners of Education, 
Agriculture, Labor, and Insurance.  
57 Mont. Const. art. V, § 6. 
58 John. M. Carey, et al., ‘The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Survey of the 50 
States’ (2006) 31 Legislative Quarterly 105; Thad Kousser, Term Limits and the Dismantling of Legislative 





The independent election of these officials gives them an autonomy that lower executive 
branch officials of the United States lack, thereby removing from the governor significant powers 
to direct executive branch policy that the President of the United States retains.  At the same 
time, with an independent electoral base to whom they are directly accountable, elected cabinet 
officials are likely somewhat more independent than cabinet officials appointed by the governor. 
In addition, unlike the U.S. Constitution, the constitutions of 38 states provide for popular 
election of all or nearly all state judges.  In some states, judges are elected in ordinary partisan 
elections in which they campaign on partisan ballot lines, though subject to professional rules of 
self-restraint that tend to dampen the intensity of campaigning by judicial candidates.59  Such 
rules do not apply, however, to parties or advocacy groups, which have increasingly been 
spending large sums on judicial races.60  In some states, judicial elections are nonpartisan.  In 
others, judges initially run for election and then stand periodically for “retention” in uncontested 
elections where the question put to the voters is whether the judge should be retained for another 
term.61 
59 See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S.Ct. 1656 (2015). 
60 Brennan Center for Justice, Who Pays for Judicial Elections? The Politics of Judicial Elections 
2015-16 (New York: New York University 2017), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Politics_of_Judicial_Elections_Final.pdf. 
61 Melinda Gann Hall, ‘State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial 
Reform’, (2001) 95 American Political Science Review 315; G. Alan Tarr, Without Fear or Favor: Judicial 






The theory behind judicial elections is that they increase the democratic accountability of 
judicial officials. Although this is acknowledged to diminish their independence, in states that 
employ judicial elections the tradeoff of independence for accountability is deemed worthwhile.62 
4.3 Human rights 
Every U.S. state constitution contains its own bill of rights.  Following the model of the 
English Civil Rights Act of 1689, the original states generally included a bill of rights in their 
constitutions immediately following independence, and when the U.S. Constitution was amended 
in 1791 to add a federal bill of rights, its drafters looked for guidance primarily to existing state 
constitutions.63  As a result, the U.S. constitutional system contains two distinct levels of rights 
protection. Although the interaction of these two levels of protection can be complex, generally 
speaking, federal rights protections establish a minimum level of respect for human rights, or 
“floor,” below which states are prohibited to go.  However, states are free (1) to establish greater, 
more expansive protection for federally protected rights above the federal floor; and (2) to offer 
protection for rights given no protection at the federal level. 
4.3.1 Duplicative rights 
Most of the rights contained in state constitutions duplicate to some degree, or overlap 
significantly with, rights protected at the federal level.  Thus, most state constitutions contain 
62 Chris W. Bonneau and Melinda Gann Hall, In Defense of Judicial Elections (New York: 
Routledge 2009). 
63 Hans A. Linde, ‘First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights’, (1980) 9 Baltimore 






specific protection for rights of speech, religion, due process, and equality, and prohibit 
unreasonable searches and seizures, self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and cruel punishments, 
all of which are protected independently at the federal level.  For example, 32 states constitutions 
contain due process clauses identical to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, and 37 contain language identical to the Speedy Trial Clause of the federal 
Sixth Amendment.64  Why state constitutions tend so frequently to duplicate federal rights 
protections presents something of a puzzle.  
One possibility, of course, is to offer greater protection for such rights than is provided by 
the federal bill of rights.  This does occur from time to time. For example, the New York 
Constitution provides greater protection for free speech than the federal Constitution, and several 
states provide greater protection against unreasonable searches than the federal Constitution.65 
Most often, however, state constitutional rights are construed to provide a level of protection that 
is exactly or substantially identical to that provided by their federal counterparts, a phenomenon 
often referred to as “lockstep” interpretation.66  The interpretation of state rights protection to 
match protections provided independently at the federal level suggests that many human rights 
provisions in state constitutions are included mainly for symbolic reasons, to express the state 
polity’s commitment to various kinds of individual liberty.  
64  James A. Gardner,. State Expansion of Federal Constitutional Liberties: Individual Rights in a 
Dual Constitutional System, (New York: Garland Publishing, 1999), Vol. 1, xi. 
65 William J. Brennan, ‘State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,’ (1977) 90 
Harvard Law Review 489. 




Another possible explanation for rights duplication is to provide backup protection for 
state citizens should the federal government fail to offer adequate protection for the rights 
concerned. However, if that is indeed the aim, the strategy is not likely to be effective as a 
practical matter. State constitutional rights are capable of constraining the behavior only of state 
government officials, not of federal ones.  Thus, if federal officials are failing to observe or 
enforce rights guaranteed by the federal constitution, the existence of state constitutional 
protections cannot protect the state populace against abuses originating at the federal level.  
However, “dialogic” models of federalism offer a different view.  These models conceive 
of the intergovernmental exchange of ideas as a mechanism by which federal and other 
decentralized systems collectively work out normatively desirable or best-practice solutions to 
common problems. On this view, state divergence from federal approaches to the same basic 
human right can precipitate system-wide rethinking of the underlying issues, and has in at least 
some notable instances caused changes in the behavior of federal courts.67 
4.3.2 Unique state rights 
Many state constitutions also contain individual rights provisions that have no federal 
counterpart. The most prominent of these is the right to an education, recognized in varying 
degrees by the constitutions of most states.68  Another is the right to a remedy, available in 39 
states, which, broadly speaking, prohibits the state from depriving individuals of access to 
67 Gardner (2003), supra note 46; Lawrence Friedman, ‘The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and 
the New Judicial Federalism’, (2000) 28 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 93. 
68 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. Constitution does not recognize such a right in San 




judicially crafted remedies for injuries of types that have traditionally been available under the 
common law. The main impact of this right is to constrain the discretion of the legislature to 
alter traditional remedies in the field of tort law.69 
Although virtually all rights contained in American constitutions are negative rights that 
restrain the state, a few state constitutions also contain positive rights, which require for their 
effectuation affirmative state action. For example, a provision of the New York Constitution 
adopted in 1938, during the Great Depression, provides: “The aid, care and support of the needy 
are public concerns and shall be provided by the state. . . .”70  Similarly, the Montana 
Constitution provides: “The legislature shall provide such economic assistance and social and 
rehabilitative services as may be necessary for those inhabitants who, by reasons of age, 
infirmities, or misfortune may have need for the aid of society.”71  Some state constitutions also 
contain positive rights provisions requiring the state to protect the environment.  For example, 
the Illinois Constitution provides: “Each person has the right to a healthful environment.  Each 
person may enforce this right against any party, governmental or private, through appropriate 
legal proceedings. . . .”72  For the most part, however, state courts have not construed positive 
rights provisions of state constitutions to impose much of an obligation on state governments.73 
69 David Schuman, ‘The Right to a Remedy’, (1992) 65 Temple Law Review 1197. 
70 N.Y. Const. art. XVII, § 1. 
71 Mont. Const. art. XII, § 3(3). 
72 Ill. Const. art. XI, § 2. 
73 Helen Hershkoff, ‘Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality 
Review’, (1999) 112 Harvard Law Review 1131; José L. Fernandez, ‘State Constitutions, Environmental Rights 




4.4 Policy principles 
Among the world’s constitutions, the U.S. Constitution is unusually short and terse, 
confining itself almost exclusively to laying out the structure of the national government and 
allocating powers among the various actors.  U.S. state constitutions are very different: most are 
considerably longer – on average more than three times longer than the national constitution74 – 
and the principal reason is that they not only devote considerable space to substantive policy 
commitments, but often go into great detail on the subjects they regulate.  Indeed, American state 
constitutions are often criticized for being excessively “legislative” in character – that is, setting 
out regulated matters with such particularity as to risk undermining the gravity and dignity of the 
constitution.75  This degree of detail is, in turn, often attributed to the relative ease with which 
state constitutions can be amended, but the phenomenon also seems to reflect an attitude toward 
state constitutions that conceives of them as entitled to considerably less reverence than is 
typically accorded the federal constitution.76 
Some policy domains commonly regulated extensively by state constitutions include: 
! Transportation policy, including the construction and funding of canals and 
railroads; 
! Corporations, including the conditions for granting corporate charters; 
74 Albert L. Sturm, ‘The Development of American State Constitutions’, (1982) 12 Publius 57. 
75  Note, ‘California’s Constitutional Amendomania’, (1949) 1 Stanford Law Review 279; William F. 
Swindler, ‘State Constitutions for the 20th Century’, (1971) 50 Nebraska Law Review 477; James A. Gardner, ‘The 
Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism’, (1992) 90 Michigan Law Review 761, 818-822. 






! Natural resources, including river levees, water allocation and usage, parks and 
recreational areas, mining and resource extraction, and environmental protection; 
! State and municipal finance, including taxation, borrowing, debt, and budgets; 
! Education policy, including methods of finance and governance.77 
In addition, numerous state constitutions contain more isolated provisions dealing with issues as 
disparate as lotteries, alcoholic beverages, racial preferences in university admissions, stem-cell 
research, and animal welfare.78 
Some of the more common substantive policy provisions were added to many state 
constitutions in response to particular historical incidents, often as a way to address episodes of 
government malfeasance.  For example, many state constitutions sharply restrict the state’s 
ability to incur debt.  These restrictions date mostly from the middle third of the nineteenth 
century, and were adopted in response to a series of disastrous public works expenditures on 
canals and railroads that caused serious financial difficulty for many states.79 
4.5 Self-imposed limits on state autonomy 
Given the very broad autonomy that U.S. states possess to decide upon the structure and 
content of subnational principles of constitutional self-governance, one might expect U.S. state 
constitutions to differ significantly from one another and from the federal constitution.  In fact, 
however, the federal and state constitutions tend to bear very strong resemblances, and in many 
77  Tarr, supra note 2; Dinan (2006), supra note 33; Dinan (2018), supra note 36. 
78  Dinan (2018), supra note 36. 
79  Gardner (1999), supra note 64, at xiii; Millard H. Ruud, ‘”No Law Shall Embrace More Than 






5 Multilevel Constitutionalism 
cases to recognize and establish identical constitutional norms, often using very similar or even 
identical language.
This was not always the case.  The earliest state constitutions diverged from one another 
significantly in structure and content, but by the 1830s or 1840s, U.S. state constitutions had 
substantially converged on a common set of institutions and constitutional practices of self-
governance.80  Today, for example, all state constitutions adopt a presidential form of 
government even though the parliamentary format is the dominant one worldwide.  All but one 
state maintains a bicameral legislature.  All have a bill of rights containing provisions that are 
highly similar not only from state to state, but across levels of government. 
Although it is difficult to discern the precise causes for this constitutional isomorphism, 
likely explanations for this kind of policy diffusion include a perception of prestige surrounding 
the U.S. Constitution; cross-borrowing and imitation in constitutional drafting processes; the 
belief that certain kinds of provisions have enjoyed success over time; and professional 
convergence on certain models as normatively superior.81 
5.1 Resolution of conflicts 
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, provisions of the federal 
constitution are “the supreme law of the land,” and state constitutional provisions may not 
conflict with federal ones. Any such conflicts are resolved in favor of the federal document, and 




conflicting state constitutional provisions are considered invalid.  In the case of provisions 
protecting human rights, as indicated in Section 4.3, where national and subnational provisions 
both protect the same right, the national provision sets the minimum level of protection, or 
“floor,” and state constitutions are free to provide a more generous level of protection for the 
right in question.  In principle, state constitutions may also provide a lower level of protection,82 
but by operation of the Supremacy Clause, state courts are obliged in such cases to enforce the 
higher level of protection offered by the U.S. Constitution.  State are free to protect rights which 
receive no federal protection at any level they choose. 
5.2 Participation of subnational units in revision of national constitution 
Under Article V, no change may be made to the U.S. Constitution without the approval of 
three-quarters of the states. That approval may be provided either by state legislatures, meeting 
in the ordinary course of business; or by special ratifying conventions convened for that purpose. 
The mode of state approval is determined by Congress when referring proposed amendments to 
the states for their consideration (Article V). 
5.3 Interaction with treaty law 
The U.S. Constitution specifically provides that treaties between the United States and 
other countries are supreme law to which all state constitutions must conform. As a practical 
matter, however, the impact of treaty law on state constitutions (and other forms of state law) is 
82 Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law 






6 Constitutional Review 
limited, for three reasons. First, the power to make treaties is reserved under the federal 
constitution exclusively to the federal government, so unlike subnational units in some European 
countries, such as Austria or Belgium, states have no opportunity to bind themselves individually 
to treaty obligations (Art. I, § 10).  Second, the United States government has historically been 
reluctant to constrain its own policy discretion through binding treaty commitments, and that 
latitude is therefore enjoyed derivatively by the states.  Third, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken 
a narrow view of the conditions in which treaty norms may be considered to bind the states, 
holding that unless a treaty obligation is clearly self-executing, it must be operationalized through 
congressional implementing legislation,83 of which there is very little. 
6.1 Jurisdiction of courts 
In the U.S. federation, each level of government, state and national, has its own judicial 
system.  Although each judicial system tends mainly to adjudicate cases arising under the law of 
its own level, both court systems have jurisdiction to adjudicate issues involving state 
constitutions, though under different – and complex – circumstances.  
State courts bear principal responsibility for policing state and local government 
compliance with the state constitution – for example, whether a law enacted by the state 
legislature complies with procedural requirements or human rights guarantees contained in the 
state constitution. Such decisions are not subject to further review by federal courts,84 so, unlike 
83 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 







decisions of subnational courts in, say, Mexico or Germany, decisions of state supreme courts 
concerning the meaning of state constitutions are final.  
Nevertheless, claims arising under the state constitution may be heard by federal courts in 
two circumstances. One is when it is alleged that a provision of the state constitution violates the 
federal constitution. Such claims may be brought initially in either state or federal court.  If they 
are adjudicated initially in state court, then the parties may ultimately seek further review from 
the U.S. Supreme Court because the legal question at issue concerns an application of the U.S. 
Constitution, on which the U.S. Supreme Court is the final authority.  The other circumstance is 
when a claim concerning the meaning of the state constitution is brought initially in federal court 
under the federal system’s “diversity” jurisdiction.  This form of jurisdiction allows federal 
courts to adjudicate state law claims when brought by citizens of one state against citizens of 
another state. The original rationale for this kind of jurisdiction, which is authorized directly by 
the U.S. Constitution itself (Art. III, § 2), was that state courts might be biased in favor of their 
own citizens, so allowing federal courts to take jurisdiction of state law claims between citizens 
of different states provides a purportedly more neutral forum. 
However, because it is extremely rare for a federal court to adjudicate a case concerning 
the state constitution under its diversity jurisdiction, the great majority of cases adjudicating 
issues of state constitutional law are handled in the state court system, and those decisions are 





6.2 Complications of dual constitutional protection of human rights 
Judicial review by state courts of state constitutions has at times produced controversy in 
the United States, particularly in the area of human rights.  As described in Section 4.3, in the 
U.S. federal system both levels of government have independent authority to provide 
constitutional protection for individual rights.  Where state constitutional rights lack a federal 
counterpart, judicial elaboration and enforcement of those rights has generally been 
uncontroversial. However, where state and federal constitutional protections for rights are 
duplicative, state judicial rulings giving broad constructions to the rights in question have 
occasionally provoked controversy of a political and sometimes partisan nature.  
The most common approach by state courts to state constitutional rights provisions that 
duplicate federally protected rights is to interpret them to have precisely the same reach and 
application as the federal version of the right – that is, in “lockstep” with the federal right.85 
Most often, the lockstep position has been taken up by state courts in the course of interpreting 
the state constitutional right in question.  Occasionally, however, the state constitution itself will 
expressly instruct state courts to interpret a particular provisions in lockstep with federal courts; 
for example, a section of the Florida Constitution prohibiting “unreasonable searches and 
seizures” provides specifically: “This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme 
Court.”86 
85 Gardner (2005), supra note 14, at 45-47. 






However, rulings by state courts that construe state constitutional rights more broadly and 
generously than the equivalent federal right have at times caused considerable political 
controversy.  Although within the legal profession, the precise grounds of the controversy have 
concerned technical issues of interpretational methodology, the relevant methodological 
disagreements are actually rooted in still unsettled disagreements, described in Section 1, about 
the nature of the U.S. federation. 
From the legal point of view, the focus of controversy concerns the circumstances in 
which a state court is methodologically justified in construing a rights provision of a state 
constitution to grant a higher level of protection to an individual right than is provided by the 
counterpart provision of the federal constitution.87  As a matter of formal law, there is no 
question that state polities have the authority to set higher levels of protection for rights in their 
own subnational constitutions than the national polity has established in the national 
constitution.88  The question, however, concerns what ought to count as evidence that state 
polities have exercised this theoretical authority. 
Distinctive constitutional language, controlling precedent, or clear legislative history are 
all possible indicators that a state constitutional right is broader in scope than its federal 
counterpart,89 but these decisive indicators almost never exist.90  This has led some state courts to 
turn to other interpretive aids, including inferences from what courts take to be the distinctive 
87 Gardner (2005), supra note 14. 
88 Brennan, supra note 65; Williams, supra note 43. 
89 Hans A. Linde, ‘E Pluribus – Constitutional Theory and State Courts’, (1984) 18 Georgia Law 
Review 165. 







   
“character” of the state polity.  For example, in an opinion holding that the Oregon Constitution's 
protection of free speech extends, unlike the federal First Amendment, to obscene expression, the 
Oregon Supreme Court rested its ruling partly on the contention that Oregon’s founders “were 
rugged and robust individuals dedicated to founding a free society unfettered by the 
governmental imposition of some people's views of morality on the free expression of others."91 
The Texas Supreme Court, in another free speech case, held that the Texas Constitution provides 
greater protection than the federal Constitution against the issuance of gag orders by trial courts.92 
The court argued that the Texas Constitution must be understood to "'reflect Texas' values, 
customs, and traditions,'"93 and supported its divergent reading of the Texas free speech provision 
by reference to the different "experiences and philosophies" of the state's founders, whose views 
were shaped by "years of rugged experience on the frontier."94 
The plausibility of such rulings depends entirely on the plausibility of the underlying 
belief that the polities of the various states – or at least of some states – hold values or possess 
social or cultural characteristics that are sufficiently distinct and deep-seated to be reflected in 
decisions concerning fundamental aspects of constitutional self-governance.95  As indicated in 
Section 1, such contentions are dubious on the merits,96 and appear to have been influenced by a 
91 State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 16 (Or. 1987). 
92 Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992). 
93 Ibid,. 16, quoting LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. 1986). 
94 Ibid., quoting James C. Harrington, The Texas Bill of Rights (1987), 41. 
95 Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1982), 94. 





lengthy, politically motivated propaganda campaign by southern states undertaken to justify first 
the institution of slavery, and then federal noninterference in informal practices of racial 
domination. 
However, another possible motivation for state courts to construe duplicative state 
constitutional rights more broadly than their federal counterparts – and one more consistent with 
the premises and operation of federalism – is simple disagreement with parallel decisions of the 
U.S. Supreme Court construing the federal constitution.97  Federal systems are designed not to 
resolve and end disagreements within a society, which is not a feasible goal, but instead to 
channel disagreements that do arise into the mold of national-subnational contestation.98  Thus, if 
in a federation internal disagreement emerges over highly contestable issues such as the meaning 
of societal commitments to free of speech or the appropriate treatment of those accused of 
crimes, it would be natural and predictable for those disagreements to find expression in 
competing rulings of state and national courts adjudicating the contested subject matter.  
In the United States, such conflicts between state and national courts have emerged 
concerning, for example, the meaning of constitutional protections against “unreasonable” 
searches and “cruel and unusual” punishments, and concerning the scope of constitutional 
protection for individual autonomy in intimate relations, in particular regarding gay sex and 
marriage.99  In all these cases, at least some state courts have construed state constitutional rights 
97 Ibid. 
98 Antoni Abat i Ninet and James A. Gardner, ‘Distinctive Identity Claims in Federal Systems: 
Judicial Policing of Subnational Variance,’ (2016) 14 International Journal of Constitutional Law 378, 378-79. 
99 Gardner (2005), supra note 14, at 100-108. 
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protections to provide greater protection to the right in question than is provided by the 
counterpart federal right.  
Such decisions, however, have from time to time provoked not only a public outcry 
against the rulings, but in many cases political punishment of the courts involved, an outcome 
facilitated in most states by the electoral accountability of judges.  For example, in 2010 three 
justices of the Iowa Supreme Court were defeated in a retention election after conservative 
groups mounted a campaign against them based on their votes in a ruling that recognized a right 
to same-sex marriage under the Iowa Constitution.  
Public political and electoral punishment of state judges for disagreeing publicly with the 
U.S. Supreme Court casts strong doubt on the theory of state cultural distinctiveness.  It suggests, 
to the contrary, that all Americans share fundamentally similar views on the proper reach and 
application of human rights, and at the very least it suggests dominance in the public mind of 
national institutions as the appropriate forums in which to work out the meaning of collective 
values. Thus, the autonomy of states to choose their own level of protection for human rights 
may be more theoretical than real.100 
100 Gardner (2013), supra note 49. 
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